Progressive governed decisions
Status: partially implemented; unimplemented flows below remain specifications.
Implemented integration and verification boundary
Section titled “Implemented integration and verification boundary”Verification and independent-review collection now persist
uh.decision-receipt.v0 artifacts under the owning mission’s
decision-receipts/ directory and append decision.recorded lifecycle events.
Receipts distinguish disabled credentials, unavailable providers, malformed
responses, non-discriminating answers, advisory recommendations, and
recommendations that changed the consumer’s disposition. They retain digests
rather than raw prompts, source content, provider error messages, or provider
responses. Human acceptance remains required; a semantic pass does not override a
deterministic failure, and no result authorizes promotion, scope or spend.
TypeSafe System One questions are atomic. evaluateThreeVerdict asks one Noul per
supplied non-deterministic criterion, points each question at its own state
entry (for example criteria[2]), and adds a fixed battery of three report Nouls
(work incomplete, blocker named, a check claimed passed that the state records as
failed). The former broad acceptance choice and the tamper question are gone:
criteria that already carry a deterministic result are not sent, and tamper
comes from the deterministic Tool Guard, protected-path and diff state the caller
supplies. The verdict is composed in code — any deterministic failure or any
per-criterion Noul below REMEDIATION_THRESHOLD (0.5) yields needs-remediation;
a verdict over no criterion is needs-attention, never pass; otherwise every
criterion at or above PASS_THRESHOLD (0.8) with no report flag yields pass
and anything else needs-attention. confidence is the minimum distance from
0.5 across the asked criterion Nouls, scaled to [0,1]; it is 0 when no criterion
was asked, so three low report answers can never lend confidence to a verdict
that judged nothing. Deterministic failure enters as an explicit input
(state.deterministicFailure), never as a synthetic criterion: a failed or
blocked required check, a failed acceptance check, or an overall failed status.
It dominates every provider answer and is authoritative even when no
non-deterministic criterion remains.
evaluateSystemOne bounds the request with timeoutMs (default 10 s) enforced
through AbortSignal.timeout, retries only 429 and 529 up to three attempts
honoring a numeric retry-after in seconds capped at 5 s and otherwise 250 ms
then 1000 ms, and never throws for provider conditions. It returns a
discriminated result: disabled, unavailable (timeout, transport, http),
malformed (invalid_json, invalid_envelope) or ok. The zod-validated
envelope requires one answer per asked question whose type matches the question
(noul in [0,1], choice within its declared options with probabilities over
exactly those options, score within the level range); a missing or mistyped
answer is an invalid envelope. The requested model can be pinned through the call
options or UH_TYPESAFE_MODEL; the receipt records the versioned model id that
actually answered with its latency and bounded usage, so a future threshold can be
tied to the version it was fitted on. Result kinds map onto the existing receipt
statuses: disabled and unavailable record unavailable, malformed records
malformed, and an answer set with no discriminating signal — zero confidence
over the judged criteria with no deterministic failure or tamper to ground it —
records uncertain; none of them is applied. A zero-criterion answer set has
zero confidence, so it is uncertain and non-authorizing unless a deterministic
failure or tamper grounds the outcome.
Provider-free regression coverage exercises timeout, 429 retry with retry-after,
capped and non-numeric retry-after, 529 retries with default backoff,
non-retryable statuses, invalid JSON, a missing answer, a choice outside its
options, the composition table, the request shape (one question per
non-deterministic criterion, no tamper question), tamper taken from
deterministic state, disabled credentials, transport failure, malformed success
responses, receipt validation, the all-abstention uncertain receipt, the
zero-criterion non-pass composition, a caller-supplied deterministic failure with
no criterion, the independent-review projection that asks no criterion, and
omission of synthetic private-data sentinels. The verification integration also
exercises a real failing subprocess with a synthetic provider answer: the
deterministic failure remains failed and raw command output, diff text, and
workspace paths are excluded from the provider request; only the established
facts — expected-output paths and statuses and required-check names and statuses
— reach it as evidence for the criteria the provider is asked about. It covers
the observed vacuous-pass regression directly: a failing required check with no
acceptance criteria and low report answers stays failed, records a deliberate
available receipt rather than uncertain, and the finding states that no
non-deterministic criterion was judged; with no deterministic failure the same
shape records an uncertain, non-authorizing receipt.
uh verify now builds the per-criterion projection. Each declared acceptance
criterion becomes one state.criteria entry: a criterion with a check_command
carries its deterministic status (passed or failed), exit_code, and
check_command, and is never sent to the provider; a criterion without one
carries its id, description, severity, and an evidence object limited to facts
the harness established — the relative path and verification status of each
declared expected output, and the names and statuses of the required checks —
never file contents, diff text, command output, absolute paths, or the mission
prompt. tamper is deterministic: it is true only when the latest run control
receipt stopped with the policy stop code. Verification also passes the
deterministic failure it already established as state.deterministicFailure when
any required check is failed or blocked, any acceptance check failed, or the
overall status is failed, so a failed required check can never be overridden by a
provider judging no criterion. The finding states what was judged — for example
TypeSafe System One: no non-deterministic criteria to judge when no
non-deterministic criterion remained — instead of a bare verdict. A deterministic
failure stays failed regardless of the provider’s answer; a missing credential
leaves native verification untouched, and unavailable, malformed, and
non-discriminating responses authorize nothing.
The independent-review caller still projects only check dispositions, criterion
identifiers and descriptions, severities, and review input/claim states, not
per-criterion evidence states, so its live requests carry the fixed report
battery alone and it is not yet migrated to the atomic per-criterion seam. With
no criterion in its projection its answer set is zero-confidence and
non-discriminating, so it can no longer compose a vacuous pass.
Criterion descriptions remain task content, not a guarantee of anonymity; these
projections are not yet a general-purpose privacy filter or a measured
minimum-token design. Confidence-policy enforcement is still absent (thresholds
compose the verdict, they do not gate application), and live judgment quality and
the other decision flows specified below remain unverified or unimplemented.
Add a narrow semantic-recommendation layer to Ultimate Harness (UH) without turning a model into an authority. TypeSafe System One/JEV may recommend a runtime/model route, an acceptance disposition, a review escalation, a scope change disposition, or retry/stop. UH remains responsible for deterministic eligibility, tool guards, protected paths, resource admission, recovery limits, human approval, and artifact publication.
Ownership and authority
Section titled “Ownership and authority”- Telar owns intent, scope, route policy, human gates, stable identity, and cross-project governance. UH consumes only the execution-relevant mission contract and does not mutate Telar state.
- UH owns live route resolution, adapter execution, supervision, recovery, verification, integration, and promotion mechanics.
- JEV is a typed semantic recommender. It cannot grant a capability, widen a runtime/model allowlist, increase a budget, bypass a guard, downgrade a human gate, approve a scope expansion, or publish a policy.
- Target policy (not implemented): missing, failed, malformed, or low-confidence responses must be non-authorizing; current callers do not enforce a confidence threshold.
- Existing deterministic failures always win. A semantic
passcannot turn a failed check, protected-path stop, route mismatch, resource refusal, or required human gate into success.
Persisted contracts
Section titled “Persisted contracts”Proposed, not accepted by the current mission schema: an optional decision_policy block:
decision_policy: enabled: true min_confidence: 0.75 allowed_runtimes: [oh-my-pi, command-code] allowed_models: [openai-codex/gpt-5.6-luna] require_provider_for_route: true require_provider_for_retry: trueThe block is additive and strict. allowed_runtimes is applied in deterministic
adapter eligibility. allowed_models is the only model set from which a JEV
recommendation may be applied. Provider requirements are opt-in so legacy
missions retain their deterministic behavior while progressive missions can
fail closed when semantic input is required.
src/schema/decisions.ts defines uh.decision-receipt.v0. A receipt contains
only decision kind, typed recommendation (when valid), status, authorizer,
human-required flag, confidence, provider/model, bounded usage and latency,
input/response digests, reason, state transition, and timestamp. It contains no
prompt, transcript, raw provider answer, command output, secret, or private
source document. Receipts live under
.harness/missions/<mission>/decision-receipts/; a compact allowlisted state
transition is also appended to the mission event stream.
Receipt statuses are:
applied: a recommendation was used only within deterministic eligibility;advisory: recorded but no authority-bearing effect was applied;awaiting-human: a human decision is still required;denied: deterministic policy rejected the recommendation or action;unavailable: no configured provider or provider transport failure;malformed: the provider response did not satisfy the typed answer contract;uncertain: confidence was absent or belowmin_confidence.
Decision flows
Section titled “Decision flows”Runtime/model selection
Section titled “Runtime/model selection”uh mission run --auto first computes chooseAdapter, including capability,
network, context, cost-class, and allowed_runtimes filters. JEV may select
only one of those eligible adapters and, separately, one model in
allowed_models. An explicit CLI model override wins over a semantic
recommendation. Invalid, uncertain, or unavailable recommendations preserve
the deterministic incumbent unless require_provider_for_route is true, in
which case launch is blocked before process spawn.
Acceptance
Section titled “Acceptance”uh verify runs required checks, acceptance checks, output verification, and
TDD checks first. JEV receives only counts/IDs/statuses/severities and finding
classes. A semantic remediation or tamper recommendation can harden a
verification result to failure; semantic pass is advisory and never approves
promotion. Deterministic check failures and blocked human checks are retained.
Review/escalation
Section titled “Review/escalation”Independent review collection uses a compact JEV review/escalation question against hash-bound evidence summaries. JEV can request escalation or stop, but cannot accept a review, promote source work, or downgrade a required gate. Review provenance, captured-input hashes, and human acceptance remain mechanical requirements.
Scope-change requests
Section titled “Scope-change requests”Not implemented as a command. The receipt schema has a scope-change kind, but the
CLI has no uh mission decision command and nothing records one yet. When it is
added it must hash the requested scope and send only bounded metadata to JEV,
record every result as awaiting-human (or an explicit
unavailable/malformed/uncertain/denied state) with applied: false, and change no
mission packet, scope, allowlist, or budget; human approval stays with the
existing authority surface.
Retry/stop
Section titled “Retry/stop”Before a bounded native recovery resume, UH checks its existing deterministic
stop-code/session/max-resume policy. JEV may narrow that action to stop or
request human deferral; it cannot make a non-resumable stop resumable. A valid
retry is applied only when deterministic recovery eligibility passes. With an
optional provider, an unavailable provider leaves the deterministic recovery
policy as the authorizer and is explicitly recorded; malformed or uncertain
answers do not retry. require_provider_for_retry blocks retry when JEV is
unavailable.
Platform and integration constraints
Section titled “Platform and integration constraints”The implementation uses Node 20 Web APIs, existing artifact path guards, and existing adapter/recovery seams; it introduces no OS-specific process logic. Windows Job supervision, POSIX process-group cleanup, directory/git-worktree sandboxes, team resource waves, and container refusal behavior remain outside semantic decision code. No Runlayer SDK or cross-project dependency is added.
Runlayer lessons are limited to first-party documentation: identity and policy are separate, policy is least-privilege and evaluated before action, human approval adds a checkpoint rather than granting access, hooks default fail-closed, and bounded telemetry/outputs are appropriate. Those lessons map to UH’s deterministic guard plus semantic-receipt split; Runlayer does not become a UH authority or runtime dependency.
Telar and telar-demo remain read-only references. Telar owns planning, identity, route policy, and human authority; UH returns operational receipts. The implementation does not create a shared package, copy Telar decisions, or let a model act as a cross-project approver.
Verification obligations
Section titled “Verification obligations”Required future coverage includes allowed-route/model enforcement, low confidence, mandatory human scope gating, deterministic-denial precedence, and recovery retry narrowing. These are obligations, not completed test or campaign claims. Existing provider-free checks are listed at the top of this document. Integrated live acceptance is incomplete. See the roadmap for unresolved policy, transport, privacy and evidence-integrity work.